Convicted of felony DWI, on appeal Hampe contended that the absence of ex­pert testimony as to the operation and reli­ability of the BAC Verifier7 should have precluded admission of his result at trial. The Third Department disagreed.  Writing for a unanimous bench, Judge Levine found Vehicle and Traffic Law '1194(4)(c) to be dispositive.  The intent of this provision, which provides that the New York State Department of Health "shall issue and file rules and regulations approving satisfactory techniques or methods of conducting chemi­cal analyses of a person's blood, urine, breath or saliva," was, in the words of the Court, "to give DOH definitive authority to approve tests for determining blood alcohol content for Vehicle and Traffic Law enforce­ment purposes. * * * [T]he device's acceptance by [the Department of Health] and the Federal Department of Transporta­tion/National Highway Traffic Safety Ad­ministration is sufficient to dispense with expert testimony of the accuracy and reli­ability of the test in establishing a founda­tion for the admissibility of BAC Verifier test results" (id., at 240-241). 

Was Hampe correct?  We think not.  Initially, the Hampe record was devoid of any proof at all as to the scientific basis or reliability of the device.  Secondly, although the Hampe Court, by citation, seemed to acquiesce in the Frye/Leone (Frye v United States, (1923) 54 App DC 46, 293 F 1013; People v Leone, (1969) 25 NY2d 511, 307 NYS2d 430) rule that re­quires proof of "reasonable accuracy and general scientific acceptance" as a predicate for admission of scientific evidence, in Hampe there was neither.  Not only was the record barren of scientific testimony, but unlike the Breathalyzer, which had achieved near universal status prior to the Fourth Department's decision in Donaldson, the BAC Verifier7 has seen such limited use that there exists no reported New York cases prior to Hampe.

Discussed above, principles of stare deci­sis dictate that Hampe be applied statewide unless one of the remaining departments or the Court of Appeals chooses to depart.

Should they?  We believe so.  The Hampe court was apparently of the belief that the legislature, by enacting '1194(4)(c), delegated the question of ad­missibility to the Department of Health.  Resolution, therefore, lies in the propriety of the delegation.  "The Legislature may constitutionally confer discretion upon an administrative agency only if it limits the field in which that discretion is to operate and provides standards to govern its exer­cise" (Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157, 404 NYS2d 565, 375 NE2d 745).

While a "precise or specific formula" has not been mandated, admission of evidence of a technical or scientific nature has been rigidly, almost jealously, protected by the judiciary through the "reasonable accuracy and general scientific acceptance" test of People v Leone, supra.  Vehicle and Traffic Law '1194(4)(c) provides only for the promulga­tion of standards approving "satisfactory techniques or methods."  Assuming, arguen­do, that the admission of breathtesting appa­ratus at trial is an appropriate field for dele­gation, blind acceptance upon the DOH or the NHTSA is nonetheless deficient inas­much as '1194(4)(c) notwithstanding, there exists no direction to the agency as to what a satisfactory technique or method shall be.

The situation created by Hampe is not unlike that encountered by the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v Scott, (1993) 121 Or App 308, 854 P2d 991.  In Scott, the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus examination had been admitted without foundation.   On appeal, the State contend­ed that no foundation was necessary since HGN had been legislatively and administra­tively approved.  Of interest in Scott is that Oregon has an implied consent statute for field sobriety testing that closely tracks the chemical test provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law '1194(2)(a)(1).  Comparable to Vehicle and Traffic Law '1194(4)(c), Ore­gon law also provides that a "field sobriety test" is a test approved by the Department of State Police.  Although admission was ulti­mately deemed harmless, the Court refused to adopt the position that the legislative act of empowering the State Police to approve field sobriety tests was analogous to regulat­ing admission at trial: "[a]lthough the legis­lature has delegated the determination of what constitutes a "field sobriety test" to the Department of State Police, that is not tan­tamount to a delegation to the agency to decide what evidence is admissible in a criminal trial" 121 Or App. at 312, 854 P.2d at 994.

Hampe is deserving  of reconsidera­tion.  In the absence of expert testimony, the issue should be preserved.